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What is informal logic? It is among the merits of Professor Goddu’s paper that it raises
this question in such a way that it should be given an answer. It raises the question,
moreover, in a way that provides a clue to the answer. With the 20-20 hindsight provided
by Goddu’s discussion, we can see that there was bound to be trouble in using the
concept of a “real argument” to demarcate the proper domain of informal logic. For, as
his discussion shows, a real argument does not correspond to any particular logical type
of inference; it would not appear as a kind in any classification of arguments by their
logical or inferential type. From the practice of informal logicians, however, we know
that they investigate arguments of all the broadly “logical” types: arguments of deductive,
inductive, analogical, and abductive type (abductive argument = inference to the best
explanation). Thus if informal logicians investigate real arguments, the concept of a “real
argument” cuts across all the logical kinds. But then what kind of argument is not a real
argument? It would appear that no kind of argument at all is excluded. Hence, if the task
of the informal logician is to construct a logic of real arguments, then it is an ill-defined
task and one has to wonder anew what informal logic really comes to. Professor Goddu
has convinced me of these things.
But what further morals can we draw from the troubles revealed by Professor
Goddu? I hope to persuade you of the truth of two further morals: (1) informal logic is
not strictly a branch of logic; it is a branch of epistemology. (2) It is an applied field, like
applied ethics or applied mathematics. In the light of these two points, as I argue at the
end, we can see what informal logic is about and even how the concept of a “real
argument” and its variants are reasonably good at delineating the classes of arguments
that are of especial interest to informal logicians.
(1) In much of their practice as well as in the comments on the nature of their
enterprise, informal logicians markedly prefer situations of controversy: situations in
which there are disputes and arguments offered by representatives of all sides of the
dispute. The informal logician is conspicuously interested in devising methods or
procedures by which the disputants can assess the comparative strengths of the arguments
that are in play and determine what it is reasonable to believe in the face of those
arguments. But these concepts of reasonable belief and the assessment of the comparative
strengths of reasons or arguments are not strictly logical concepts. They are
epistemological concepts. The informal logician is therefore concerned with the
epistemology of conflicting arguments. He or she is concerned, in particular, with how
one can resolve such conflicts so as to judge what it is reasonable to believe in the face of
conflicting arguments.
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This is not to suggest that logic is irrelevant or unimportant to the informal
logician. On the contrary. For what could be more relevant or helpful than the techniques
of logical analysis in the evaluation of arguments? And what do we often find informal
logicians doing in practice if not applying logical techniques in the evaluation of
arguments? But the informal logician’s interest extends beyond the application of logical
techniques, and the immediate results of such application, to the wider question of what it
is reasonable to believe when confronted by conflicting aguments. Their interest extends
to epistemological questions.
(2) Informal logicians are often interested in understanding and dispelling what
we could call “the fog of controversy”: the clutter and confusion (in practice the fallacies)
that often reveal themselves in the arguments that occur in controversies. 1 A serious
disputant has to distinguish the good arguments from the bad, the relevant arguments
from the irrelevant, and then assess the comparative strengths of the arguments that
qualify as good enough to merit serious consideration. Such distinctions are sometimes
quite difficult to make. But the difficulties are not theoretical ones in either logic or
epistemology: they are difficulties that stand in the way of the application of logical and
epistemological principles. In this respect informal logic is like applied ethics or applied
mathematics. All three are concerned with nontrivial problems involved in the application
of theoretical principles. All three seek out the mess, clutter, and confusion of “real life”
problems. For it is there that the most difficult and interesting problems of application are
to be found.
Seen from the present perspective, the quotation Goddu takes from Blair and
Johnson presents a very different, and more instructive, aspect:
We need a term to refer … to arguments actually used in a first-order way to attempt to
convince—and moreover used without self-consciousness about the ‘nature’ or ‘structure’ of some
ideal argument. The term ‘natural arguments’ will then distinguish such arguments from those
which are invented just in order to serve as examples, and also (for the most part) from those
which are self-consciously framed according to an explicit model of argument (such as arguments
with numbered premises sometimes found in philosophy journal articles). 2

For we can now see in this an effort to indicate the classes of arguments most in need of
the sort of investigation—the kinds of interpretation, analysis, and evaluation—that the
informal logician has made it his or her business to conduct. If I am right, then it will of
course be arguments “used without self-consciousness about the ‘nature’ or structure’ of
some ideal argument,” arguments not “self-consciously framed according to an explicit
model of argument,” that will draw the attention of the informal logician. For arguments
expressed in such “raw” fashion afford the greatest challenges both to the application of
logical methods and to the arrival at reasonable judgments about what to believe.
Professor Goddu says he is not sure what it would take to be an informal logician.
In view of his paper, I think he raises a fair question: What does it take to be an informal
logician? To this I think I have outlined a fair answer. It is to be an applied epistemologist
or, if you like, an applied logician—I don’t insist on either term. The substantive point is
1

Blair and Johnson nicely express this side of informal logic in their choice of title for one of their books:
Logical Self-Defense.
2
J. A. Blair and R. Johnson, Informal Logic: The First International Symposium. (Point Reyes: Edgepress,
1980), p. 27 n 20. Quoted in Goddu, “What is a Real Argument?,” p. 6.
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that the informal logician is in an applied field. He or she is interested in “natural”
arguments, as Blair and Johnson put it; that is, arguments that are presented in real life
controversies and especially in those controversies in which the arguers are not informed
by knowledge of logical theories or principles. The arguments of especial interest to the
informal logician, to be sure, will not be different in logical kind from those propounded
by logical sophisticates—Professor Goddu has shown the broken-backed character of that
idea. But they will be differently expressed, and so expressed as to present much greater
difficulties for the steps of interpretation and analysis that are required for the effective
application of logical principles.
link to paper
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